Very interesting, thank you. I was confused about the two back to back articles, so I first read the one from the perspective of General Percival, which gave me quite a different view of the Japanese side. Having read this now, it was an eye opener.
Some people are simply - either by talent or extensive training - excellent strategists. Yamashita seems to have been such a person, and despite your arguments in the other post about Gen. Percival, in this whole debate, he did seem a good person but not in the right place.
My book backlog is very long, however I added "The Generals" to it. Thanks for the post!
Thanks! The problem with Percival is that the entire command system for the defence of Malaya and Singapore was dysfunctional. Even a brilliant leader in these circumstances would have failed but its interesting to see who failure was the product of a whole series of small things - from Brookham's reluctance to enter Thailand, to the failure to protect the airfields, to commanders undertaking precipitate withdrawals without authorization, to ego-driven commanders (like Bennett) doing their own thing, to Wavell changing plans in the middle of the campaign on the basis of a fleeting visit etc.
Very interesting, thank you. I was confused about the two back to back articles, so I first read the one from the perspective of General Percival, which gave me quite a different view of the Japanese side. Having read this now, it was an eye opener.
Some people are simply - either by talent or extensive training - excellent strategists. Yamashita seems to have been such a person, and despite your arguments in the other post about Gen. Percival, in this whole debate, he did seem a good person but not in the right place.
My book backlog is very long, however I added "The Generals" to it. Thanks for the post!
Thanks! The problem with Percival is that the entire command system for the defence of Malaya and Singapore was dysfunctional. Even a brilliant leader in these circumstances would have failed but its interesting to see who failure was the product of a whole series of small things - from Brookham's reluctance to enter Thailand, to the failure to protect the airfields, to commanders undertaking precipitate withdrawals without authorization, to ego-driven commanders (like Bennett) doing their own thing, to Wavell changing plans in the middle of the campaign on the basis of a fleeting visit etc.