Re withdrawal. We agree. I blame a few things along with Slim. One is nature of The appreciation (now estimate). You will have seen it written by Scoones and widely distributed. The structure of the estimate is not much changed even now other than some mission command stuff bolted on the front. The problem is it suggests debate and is not, of itself, an order. Thus, on receipt eg Gracey scribbles contrarian thoughts on their copy. And as you said continued their disagreement even when ordered.
Yes, that does make sense. I always liked Scoones appreciation but you are 100% right: it wasn't an order. That said, Gracey, a very impressive man, should have known that at the point he was outflanked, he had to withdraw! There simply wasn't the aircraft resources available to support him if he were surrounded, because they were all off dropping Spam and bullets to the Chindits. It was one rule for the box in Sinzweya, and another for the box in Moreh.
Thanks Robert. This was an excellent read and I knew little about this phase despite my father fighting throughout it. What you describe -roads and river crossings- sounds like an excellent RE rich story. It matches the more famous 8th Army advance up central Italy in terms of engineer effort. Whereas Imphal itself struck me as a campaign where combat engineering was not that prominent.
Also, something struck me as I trundled up and down the Kabaw valley. Slim of course decided to fight Imphal well back to give the greater supply problem to the Japanese. Correct. But in say Dec 43 Ie before Imphal started there was a 50 odd km no man’s land between the two Armies. (The distance was even longer since supply line did not run across the valley but up and down it. ) I counted 50 bridges on the supply running south of Moreh of which about 3 were down in my year of travel. But this was no man’s land. No side could get bulldozers to fix this contested area before an attack or defence. So Slim’s genius was not just giving the distance to the Japanese but avoiding using the part which was devoid of engineer effort. The fact the British withdrawal was not well executed is another matter.
Thanks Simon. I agree with you about the withdrawal. Its a bit of a mystery as to why the withdrawal was such a mess. Slim has to take some of the blame for this. On the one hand, as you say, he had planned as early as December 1943 to 'withdraw to the hills' (as he had told John Twells) and yet we have that letter from Gracey to Scoones when the withdrawal order was given, bitterly resenting the order. Strange, as one would have expected Gracey to have understood Slim's strategy. Either he didn't, or Slim hadn't explained it to him.
Was your lecture at York recorded online?
Sadly not I'm afraid
Re withdrawal. We agree. I blame a few things along with Slim. One is nature of The appreciation (now estimate). You will have seen it written by Scoones and widely distributed. The structure of the estimate is not much changed even now other than some mission command stuff bolted on the front. The problem is it suggests debate and is not, of itself, an order. Thus, on receipt eg Gracey scribbles contrarian thoughts on their copy. And as you said continued their disagreement even when ordered.
Yes, that does make sense. I always liked Scoones appreciation but you are 100% right: it wasn't an order. That said, Gracey, a very impressive man, should have known that at the point he was outflanked, he had to withdraw! There simply wasn't the aircraft resources available to support him if he were surrounded, because they were all off dropping Spam and bullets to the Chindits. It was one rule for the box in Sinzweya, and another for the box in Moreh.
Thanks Robert. This was an excellent read and I knew little about this phase despite my father fighting throughout it. What you describe -roads and river crossings- sounds like an excellent RE rich story. It matches the more famous 8th Army advance up central Italy in terms of engineer effort. Whereas Imphal itself struck me as a campaign where combat engineering was not that prominent.
Also, something struck me as I trundled up and down the Kabaw valley. Slim of course decided to fight Imphal well back to give the greater supply problem to the Japanese. Correct. But in say Dec 43 Ie before Imphal started there was a 50 odd km no man’s land between the two Armies. (The distance was even longer since supply line did not run across the valley but up and down it. ) I counted 50 bridges on the supply running south of Moreh of which about 3 were down in my year of travel. But this was no man’s land. No side could get bulldozers to fix this contested area before an attack or defence. So Slim’s genius was not just giving the distance to the Japanese but avoiding using the part which was devoid of engineer effort. The fact the British withdrawal was not well executed is another matter.
Thanks Simon. I agree with you about the withdrawal. Its a bit of a mystery as to why the withdrawal was such a mess. Slim has to take some of the blame for this. On the one hand, as you say, he had planned as early as December 1943 to 'withdraw to the hills' (as he had told John Twells) and yet we have that letter from Gracey to Scoones when the withdrawal order was given, bitterly resenting the order. Strange, as one would have expected Gracey to have understood Slim's strategy. Either he didn't, or Slim hadn't explained it to him.
It's very enlightening
Hopefully pick you up a copy at WHWFD.