I have read a range of books about the British Army recently, and they have all been very different, despite covering much the same ground. Simon Akam’s The Changing of the Guard (Scribe, 2021) accused the army – in effect – of failing to comprehend the nature of the fighting with which it was tasked, in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This was in part because, he argued, of a mixture of hide-bound traditionalism and, to put it bluntly, the careerism of its commanders. In Akam’s view the army wasn’t professional enough to adapt itself to the challenges it faced in both these places. While I liked the book – there is much in it that as an ex-soldier I recognised – I was still troubled by it. Did it really represent the British Army I knew, and had known intimately for 40-years? It was only when I read Ben Barry’s magisterial
I’m not an academic, a historian, and did not serve in the military. I’m a fairly serious student of history and I try to read good books on the subject. I have a small collection of books on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. I wanted to understand why both went so wrong. Two books I would recommend as a short cut. Firstly An Intimate War by Mike Martin, recommended to be by Adrian Weale. And secondly Unwinnable by Theo Farrell. It seemed to me that (1) we failed to really understand the enemy, their motivation, community, timescales, (2) the politicians didn’t have a clear objective, or at the very least had shifting objectives, (3) politicians were terrified of casualties and constrained the options available to the professional military, (4) the Army was repeatedly asked to do too much without the appropriate resources. As ever happy to be corrected.
As ever, very well thought and put Robert! I’m hoping that volume will come; post Ukraine and our international proxy support to a peer on peer conflict rather than just look at Iraq and Afghanistan as a stand alone conflict and the context of the firm and function of our military.
The eternal post-war problem has been governmental champagne tastes on a pauper budget. The reality of being unable to rebuild post-war while funding large conventional forces was fudged in 1953 with the Radical Review led by AM Slessor which, by adopting a graduated nuclear response, reduced BAOR to a trip wire and time delay role until the collapse of the wall in 1991. In parallel with that the Army et al dealt with the 'retreat from empire, 1982 being the most notable part, and The Troubles in some way another - that has yet to be finished. 9/11 must have come as a relief for the Mod & 3 Services in the absence of any other role and with the politicos having failed to set strategic end points for Iran and Afghanistan we should not have been surprised at the outcomes - despite the Army making a decent fist of reshaping itself to respond.
Interesting thing is now, and the questions: firstly, are we in the late 30s or the early 50s again with China instead of Germany or the USSR, and how does the west respond; and what Army fits with that.
Until that is answered by politicians it is pointless to decide what the Army should look like and do.
I’m not an academic, a historian, and did not serve in the military. I’m a fairly serious student of history and I try to read good books on the subject. I have a small collection of books on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. I wanted to understand why both went so wrong. Two books I would recommend as a short cut. Firstly An Intimate War by Mike Martin, recommended to be by Adrian Weale. And secondly Unwinnable by Theo Farrell. It seemed to me that (1) we failed to really understand the enemy, their motivation, community, timescales, (2) the politicians didn’t have a clear objective, or at the very least had shifting objectives, (3) politicians were terrified of casualties and constrained the options available to the professional military, (4) the Army was repeatedly asked to do too much without the appropriate resources. As ever happy to be corrected.
As ever, very well thought and put Robert! I’m hoping that volume will come; post Ukraine and our international proxy support to a peer on peer conflict rather than just look at Iraq and Afghanistan as a stand alone conflict and the context of the firm and function of our military.
The eternal post-war problem has been governmental champagne tastes on a pauper budget. The reality of being unable to rebuild post-war while funding large conventional forces was fudged in 1953 with the Radical Review led by AM Slessor which, by adopting a graduated nuclear response, reduced BAOR to a trip wire and time delay role until the collapse of the wall in 1991. In parallel with that the Army et al dealt with the 'retreat from empire, 1982 being the most notable part, and The Troubles in some way another - that has yet to be finished. 9/11 must have come as a relief for the Mod & 3 Services in the absence of any other role and with the politicos having failed to set strategic end points for Iran and Afghanistan we should not have been surprised at the outcomes - despite the Army making a decent fist of reshaping itself to respond.
Interesting thing is now, and the questions: firstly, are we in the late 30s or the early 50s again with China instead of Germany or the USSR, and how does the west respond; and what Army fits with that.
Until that is answered by politicians it is pointless to decide what the Army should look like and do.