The National Security Strategy (NSS25)

Some first thoughts

The government published its so-called National Security Strategy (NSS25) this week, probably to coincide with the NATO summit, attended by the Prime Minister and, presumably, to head off President Trump’s accusations that European members of NATO are still failing to take seriously the challenge of funding defence. Like the SDR, it’s writing was led by a third party, in this case the academic historian Professor John Bew, of King’s College London. For this reason you would be unsurprised to hear that its 55-pages is well crafted and elegantly written although, as this is also a political document, it is also surprisingly high on rhetoric and hyperbolising adjectives.

I don’t want to be too critical, for I think the document is important, but I have been slightly underwhelmed by it, both in respect of its content, its timing and its accompanying financial commitments because, in the final analysis, it is only when this country puts its hands in its pockets to fund rearmament that we will really understand the extent of it’s commitment to defence and security. Does the Government’s words match the reality of boots on the ground, planes in the air and ships in and boats under the sea? The evidence suggests that at the moment it does so only partly, and possibly reluctantly. It might also be said that it is being led unwillingly, or by the nose, by a POTUS angry at the failure of the European members of NATO to fully embrace fair levels of burden sharing. Likewise, NSS25 comes in a week when the Prime Minister has been forced into a humiliating U-turn on benefits worth annually many billions of pounds to buy rebels on his back benches. People, Labour MPs certainly, still want butter over guns.

But, let’s be positive. The term ‘security’ is a good place to start. Security is important, because security is not just defence. Or, more correctly, defence is only part of security. It is important for the government to set out the context for thinking seriously about the UK’s security in the round, and NSS25 attempts to do this, at least in the external sphere; it doesn’t touch on the domestic threats to our security which, on recent evidence with many in the country losing their heads over the idea of Palestine and virulent anti-Israeli sentiment in some quarters, I suggest will be a really serious problem for the UK if it goes to war against either a Russian or a Middle Eastern enemy in the near term. We seem almost entirely open to attack from within; one can only hope that MI5 have their eyes wide open.

But in the traditional context of external defence, NSS25 complements the recently published SDR. This is where I’m slightly confused. Logically, the NSS25 should have come before the SDR, but the government hasn’t managed the sequencing of these reviews well. The NSS25 should have explained the security situation the UK finds itself in; the SDR should then have followed with a ‘so what’ rationale for defence as a whole and, after that, the Defence Infrastructure Strategy (still a week or two away) should have laid out the implications for us in terms of quantity of tons of steel and concrete required to deliver the imperatives set out by the NSS25 and SDR. This hasn’t been the case. Nevertheless, we are where we are, but the two documents received so far (SDR + NSS25) need to be read in tandem. Indeed, there is quite some duplication between them.

The background to the NSS25 can be summed up in the sub-title, ‘Security for the British people in a dangerous world.’ The government clearly believe that it’s time to be explicit about the range of threats, some old and some new, that we face as a country, in order to make the argument to substantiate increasing defence expenditure.

But what does it say?

Threats

For the first time in living memory the NSS25 sets out Britain’s enemies, namely Putin’s Russia, Iran and China. In a frank admission, it posits the notion that we have not been living in an era of peace and security over recent decades, but rather we’ve been presiding over a slow demise in real security as regional warlords (e.g. Ayatollah and Putin) flex their muscles and endanger us all.

In this context we need to think of security beyond commonplace defence parameters and determinants. In this new calculation security includes cyber, and preventing foreign hackers taking down M&S, for example. But NSS25 reiterated the reality that mainland UK was also at threat of direct physical attack, if not invasion, in a significant way for the first time since the end of the Cold War 35-years ago.

Defence spending

There has been much trading of statistics recently by Government ministers, a fact that should make us all suspicious.

The SDR promised defence expenditure of 2.5% of GDP by 2027, a rise from the 2.3% at present. In the recent Comprehensive Spending Review the Chancellor mentioned 2.6%, but caveated this by saying that this figure included expenditure on the security services. In the NSS25 and at the NATO Conference the Prime Minister started bandying about much more significant numbers.

The context of course is important. Commentators such as Lord Dannatt have been arguing for a long time that we need to be spending 3% now, and 5% by the end of the decade, in order to fill the holes in our long depleted arsenal. POTUS is also on record as threatening to leave NATO if its European members don’t spend more.

Remember also that since a sleight of hand in 2010 the Conservative government of David Cameron began counting the CASD and military pensions in this calculation of defence spending, something that had hitherto not been the case.

Now, it appears defence spending as a proportion of GDP will massively increase, to 4.1% by 2030ish and 5% by 2035. This, of course, is something of a cheat, and makes one wonder whether the government can be this stupid. Does it not understand why so many citizens of this country no longer believe its politicians? The new figure doesn’t represent a real increase in defence spending at all, or at least anything new in respect of what has already been announced. It is certainly not an increase over what has already been announced, namely 2.6% of GDP plus a further 1.5% on security-related expenditure, money that is incidentally already being spent. This security-related expenditure includes a wide range of things such as electricity supply, broadband, energy, border, infrastructure and so on. So, by 2035 the aspiration is to spend 5 % of GDP to national security, of which 3.5% on core defence (tanks, guns, ships, boats etc.,) and 1.5% on these new categories of resilience and broader security. But this is a long way off, and for Downing Street is a commitment they don’t need to worry about as it will be in the next parliament. Lets look at the 2030 commitment. A target of 4.1% by 2030 means an increase from 2.5% in 2027 to 2.6% (4.1% minus 1.5%) by 2030, which, taking inflation into account, is absolutely no increase at all. Whitehall - or Downing Street at least - is clearly cooking the books, or taking us for fools.

SDR

There is a look back to the SDR, asserting that it is fully aligned with the NSS25. I’m glad it is, or else the government would have been awfully embarrassed by any dysfunction between both documents. We can be sure that Professor Bew scoured the SDR to ensure that he wasn’t saying anything untoward.

In this respect the NSS25 recycles a lot of ‘old news’ including:

• Raising troop numbers to ~76,000 (plus reserves +20%)

• £15 bn for nuclear warheads; building 12 SSN-AUKUS submarines

• Development of long-range missiles, autonomous drones, AI-enhanced “digital warfighters”

• Establishing a Cyber and Electromagnetic Command (CyberEM Command)

• Expanding cadet forces by 30% to engage society.

New Initiatives

But there were some new ideas and new financial commitments. These include:

• The National Biosecurity Centre in Surrey will receive £1bn investment to prevent future pandemics.

• A Cyber Security & Resilience Bill to bolster protections for critical infrastructure including mandatory incident reporting across major organisations.

• Legal enhancements via the National Security Act, strengthening laws on espionage, sabotage, and foreign interference.

Technological & Industrial Sovereignty

NSS25 argues that the document integrates previous reviews (AI, AUKUS, trade, China, supply chains) into a cohesive framework, and in this it is true, although the fact that it didn’t coincide with SDR and has been published before the Defence Industrial Strategy suggests that it isn’t well coordinated across government (quelle surprise) and may in fact be incomplete. Only time will tell. Please don’t think that I’m a natural cynic, but we need to remember that above all else this document is political.

The NSS25 places an emphasis on what it describes as a defence-industrial renaissance, including supporting supply chains, munitions factories (“always on”), export growth, and a Defence Innovation Fund (£400m). This, of course, is incredibly important for Britain’s crumbling defence infrastructure, especially in respect of commitments to programmes such as the F26, AUKUS replacement and Global Combat Air Programme in the next decade.

I was privileged to attend the opening of BAE’s Janet Harvey Hall on 25 June on behalf of McLaughlin & Harvey, with Commodore Steve Roberts (left) and Rear Admiral Mark Beverstock (right)

Multilateral Cooperation & Balance with China

NSS25 reaffirms the UK’s commitment to effective multilateralism through NATO, Five Eyes, and global institutions.

An interesting dimension to NSS25 is the extent to which it attempts to balance potential threats with trade realities. For instance, despite acknowledging threats from China—cyber, economic espionage, democratic interference—the UK wants to balance security with continued engagement, acknowledging China’s role as a top‑three trading partner. This is pragmatic realism asserting itself.

Conclusions

NSS25 offers us, therefore:

• A significant leap in defence and resilience spending (5 % GDP by 2035, if you believe the numbers) unparalleled since the Cold War, though the numbers are definitely cooked, as the security element needs to be discounted to get to the real defence numbers. The actual amount of new money being spent on defence capability (not to mention security more generally) will be the measure by which NSS25 - and this government’s promises - will ultimately be measured.

• A defence upgrade including nuclear deterrent, cyber command, long‑range weapons, force expansion (all presaged in the SDR)

• Strengthened homeland resilience: biosecurity, cyber protection, legal tools to counter espionage (these are genuinely new)

• Tech and industrial sovereignty prioritized—AI, R&D, manufacturing, exports.

• Nuanced global posture: assertive security readiness combined with diplomatic balance, including complex China relations.

We might just see a spending plan in the Defence Industrial Strategy, but please don’t hold your breath. That said, these documents are useful paving stones denoting a new direction of travel for UK defence and UK defence infrastructure, all of which must be regarded as a ‘good thing.’