A really interesting and thought-provoking piece. I've been to Singapore and to Thailand (lived in the latter, actually) so am familiar with some of the locations of the campaign. I must say, your March trip with Cultural Tours sounds wonderful.
“He was slow to see the urgency of the situation, overly conscious of the needs of commerce, and failed to grasp single mindedly all the issues of defence at a stage early enough to be able to introduce changes that could make a difference “
Are you talking about Singapore 1940 or Europe in 2024?
Another point arises if one moves away from the notion of casting General Percival as a staff officer in a negative light. Percival’s attributes made him an excellent planner and thinker, which are valuable attributes for a staff officer or war planner.
Regrettably, Brooke Popham’s indecision regarding his failure to launch Operation Matador has escaped historical scrutiny. Like in North Africa, General Wavell’s ABDA command responsibilities left him with too much on his plate. Wavell’s misjudgements also came back to haunt British Forces in both instances.
So my counterfactual question is, who should have taken Wavell, Popham and Percival’s place?
Great point, but the problem for Malaya and Singapore was systemic, by which I mean that any half decent commander would have made a good fist of this if the system was working in their favour i.e., a single joint commander working to a single, universally agreed plan. It’s a truth universally acknowledged in military circles that this is the only way to manage unruly or egocentric subordinates like Bennett; bind them to the plan!
Agreed. Getting a sound command structure in place would have been difficult. Also, someone determined to lift training standards and replace incompetent commanders down to the battalion level would have had downsides.
Someone forthright like Francis Tuker would have upset the administrators who never thought about Malaya and Singapore's defences.
A really interesting and thought-provoking piece. I've been to Singapore and to Thailand (lived in the latter, actually) so am familiar with some of the locations of the campaign. I must say, your March trip with Cultural Tours sounds wonderful.
Thank you Nick
“He was slow to see the urgency of the situation, overly conscious of the needs of commerce, and failed to grasp single mindedly all the issues of defence at a stage early enough to be able to introduce changes that could make a difference “
Are you talking about Singapore 1940 or Europe in 2024?
Quite!
Another point arises if one moves away from the notion of casting General Percival as a staff officer in a negative light. Percival’s attributes made him an excellent planner and thinker, which are valuable attributes for a staff officer or war planner.
Regrettably, Brooke Popham’s indecision regarding his failure to launch Operation Matador has escaped historical scrutiny. Like in North Africa, General Wavell’s ABDA command responsibilities left him with too much on his plate. Wavell’s misjudgements also came back to haunt British Forces in both instances.
So my counterfactual question is, who should have taken Wavell, Popham and Percival’s place?
Great point, but the problem for Malaya and Singapore was systemic, by which I mean that any half decent commander would have made a good fist of this if the system was working in their favour i.e., a single joint commander working to a single, universally agreed plan. It’s a truth universally acknowledged in military circles that this is the only way to manage unruly or egocentric subordinates like Bennett; bind them to the plan!
Agreed. Getting a sound command structure in place would have been difficult. Also, someone determined to lift training standards and replace incompetent commanders down to the battalion level would have had downsides.
Someone forthright like Francis Tuker would have upset the administrators who never thought about Malaya and Singapore's defences.