A few depressing rumours are swirling around about the SDR process which seem to indicate that the ongoing Strategic and Defence Review is to be another attempt to squeeze the UK’s defence strategy into the (very) limited money available.
A problem well encapsulated Rob. It occurred to me when commenting on Defence Planning Assumptions for the original SDR, that it was impossible to define and get endorsement of a potentially key - if missing - component, that of 'political ambition,' or 'will.' Without it, DPAs should always come back to threat-based assumptions on potential engagement to drive capability, but inevitably end up being more about 'what could we do with what we've got or can afford now'.
The current (and past ) governments seem oblivious to what's already less of an assumption and increasingly more a probability ........
Another superb article Rob. Thanks. I can’t help a comment this morning having contributed to a SDR submission. Whilst I’m not going to go into any classical theories of strategy, but Ends, Ways, Means, I’d suggest is still relevant for this next SDR. There’s a reason why ‘means’ comes last. After the strategic analysis, you either find more ‘means’ to match the analysis or you prioritise and do the most important strategic objectives you can afford. But it must, in my humble opinion, only be in that order.
I so agree about the Army being a deterrent. A strategic deterrent. I’d also suggest that industry as a strategic deterrent is key too. Certainly, manufacturing industry, but also service support industrial partners too. Any enemy should look at us and determine that our Armed forces on Operations will never run out or never be unsupported by their industry or never be left behind in innovation. That should serve as a pretty powerful factor in deterrent too.
I recently brushed up on the basics of your Strategic Defence Review (SDR), as I was curious about the parallels between the UK and U.S. approaches to defense strategy. On the American side, our equivalent would be the National Defense Strategy (NDS). However, I couldn't find a UK counterpart to the U.S. Commission on the National Defense Strategy—an independent, bipartisan body tasked with providing an external assessment of the Department of Defense's NDS.
The U.S. Commission on the NDS has been raising alarms that echo the concerns expressed in this article, and others featured in The War Room. One of our first Substack posts covered the release of the Commission's 2024 report, which opened with a stark warning:
“The United States faces urgent and monumental challenges. Meeting them will require bold leadership, consensus, and the willingness to change course.”
This is another excellent article, and I wish you the best of luck influencing perspectives on your side of the Atlantic. There’s no shortage of differing opinions on how to tackle these challenges on this side of the Atlantic—both inside and outside the military community. Our Marine Corps is one example.
David, in the U.K. we don’t have the equivalent of the NDS, sadly. Defence here is very poorly served by high quality, independent challenge. Those organisations (such as RUSI) that offer commentary on defence issues are too closely aligned with government to offer alternative views, and there is no single body that offers anything like the objective analysis of the NDS. Defence here has always been a political football, subject to the whims of crusading ideologues (like Tony Blair) and cost cutters on both sides of the political divide who have never understood the need to pay an insurance premium to prevent the house burning down.
A problem well encapsulated Rob. It occurred to me when commenting on Defence Planning Assumptions for the original SDR, that it was impossible to define and get endorsement of a potentially key - if missing - component, that of 'political ambition,' or 'will.' Without it, DPAs should always come back to threat-based assumptions on potential engagement to drive capability, but inevitably end up being more about 'what could we do with what we've got or can afford now'.
The current (and past ) governments seem oblivious to what's already less of an assumption and increasingly more a probability ........
Exactly Ian
Another superb article Rob. Thanks. I can’t help a comment this morning having contributed to a SDR submission. Whilst I’m not going to go into any classical theories of strategy, but Ends, Ways, Means, I’d suggest is still relevant for this next SDR. There’s a reason why ‘means’ comes last. After the strategic analysis, you either find more ‘means’ to match the analysis or you prioritise and do the most important strategic objectives you can afford. But it must, in my humble opinion, only be in that order.
I so agree about the Army being a deterrent. A strategic deterrent. I’d also suggest that industry as a strategic deterrent is key too. Certainly, manufacturing industry, but also service support industrial partners too. Any enemy should look at us and determine that our Armed forces on Operations will never run out or never be unsupported by their industry or never be left behind in innovation. That should serve as a pretty powerful factor in deterrent too.
Exactly right Geoff, thank you. And what a superb point about industry, one with which I strongly concur.
I recently brushed up on the basics of your Strategic Defence Review (SDR), as I was curious about the parallels between the UK and U.S. approaches to defense strategy. On the American side, our equivalent would be the National Defense Strategy (NDS). However, I couldn't find a UK counterpart to the U.S. Commission on the National Defense Strategy—an independent, bipartisan body tasked with providing an external assessment of the Department of Defense's NDS.
The U.S. Commission on the NDS has been raising alarms that echo the concerns expressed in this article, and others featured in The War Room. One of our first Substack posts covered the release of the Commission's 2024 report, which opened with a stark warning:
“The United States faces urgent and monumental challenges. Meeting them will require bold leadership, consensus, and the willingness to change course.”
This is another excellent article, and I wish you the best of luck influencing perspectives on your side of the Atlantic. There’s no shortage of differing opinions on how to tackle these challenges on this side of the Atlantic—both inside and outside the military community. Our Marine Corps is one example.
FYI, I just ordered the book.
David, in the U.K. we don’t have the equivalent of the NDS, sadly. Defence here is very poorly served by high quality, independent challenge. Those organisations (such as RUSI) that offer commentary on defence issues are too closely aligned with government to offer alternative views, and there is no single body that offers anything like the objective analysis of the NDS. Defence here has always been a political football, subject to the whims of crusading ideologues (like Tony Blair) and cost cutters on both sides of the political divide who have never understood the need to pay an insurance premium to prevent the house burning down.