It’s difficult, even now, to get a good understanding of the events immediately prior to the Japanese surrender in 1945, and the influence of the atomic bombing on their decision, since most of the contemporaneous records and other documentation were destroyed, and most of the decision makers committed suicide rather than allowing themselves to be taken prisoner.
Similarly, the negotiations held in Switzerland, and the nature of the undertakings and understandings given in the course of these negotiations to the Japanese by the United States, have never, as far as I know, been made public in their entirety.
Suffice to say that the - theoretical - ‘unconditional surrender’, was by no means unconditional, as the Americans, desperate to avoid the necessity of an amphibious assault on the Japanese homeland, with the attendant heavy casualties, basically agreed to allow the Japanese state, its economy, and its system of government to continue, post-war, more or less unchanged.
The Japanese of course would have been very well aware that, after their defeat in Manchuria, to their north were 1.5 million Soviet troops, supported by tens of thousands of artillery pieces, tanks and aircraft, and that in the event of a Soviet invasion, unconditional surrender would have meant exactly that, the Soviets being notably unfriendly to emperors.
So, given their situation, surrendering promptly to the Americans, subject to the assurances provided, was the logical choice for Japan, regardless of the potential for further nuclear attacks.
Yes, pretty much agree with this. My thesis is that of the collapsing structure of militarism amongst Japanese decision-makers, and its hold on Hirohito (countered by Tojo, of course), in which the atomic bombs were the final parts of a crumbling belief that Japan's civilization would win the war and survive what came afterwards.
Thank you for another interesting article.
It’s difficult, even now, to get a good understanding of the events immediately prior to the Japanese surrender in 1945, and the influence of the atomic bombing on their decision, since most of the contemporaneous records and other documentation were destroyed, and most of the decision makers committed suicide rather than allowing themselves to be taken prisoner.
Similarly, the negotiations held in Switzerland, and the nature of the undertakings and understandings given in the course of these negotiations to the Japanese by the United States, have never, as far as I know, been made public in their entirety.
Suffice to say that the - theoretical - ‘unconditional surrender’, was by no means unconditional, as the Americans, desperate to avoid the necessity of an amphibious assault on the Japanese homeland, with the attendant heavy casualties, basically agreed to allow the Japanese state, its economy, and its system of government to continue, post-war, more or less unchanged.
The Japanese of course would have been very well aware that, after their defeat in Manchuria, to their north were 1.5 million Soviet troops, supported by tens of thousands of artillery pieces, tanks and aircraft, and that in the event of a Soviet invasion, unconditional surrender would have meant exactly that, the Soviets being notably unfriendly to emperors.
So, given their situation, surrendering promptly to the Americans, subject to the assurances provided, was the logical choice for Japan, regardless of the potential for further nuclear attacks.
Yes, pretty much agree with this. My thesis is that of the collapsing structure of militarism amongst Japanese decision-makers, and its hold on Hirohito (countered by Tojo, of course), in which the atomic bombs were the final parts of a crumbling belief that Japan's civilization would win the war and survive what came afterwards.
I’ve read Rain of Ruin. Eye opening is how I would describe it.