The Wandering Army

A recommendation

I have recently read and hugely enjoyed Dr Huw Davies’ fabulous book about the development of the British Army between the mid-1740s and 1815. Sub-titled ‘The Campaigns that Transformed the British Way of War’ it is a refreshing analysis of how the Army adapted to the ever-changing circumstances which it faced in battles, wars and campaigns that stretched half way around the globe, from America to the Iberian Peninsula, to Argentina (yes!) and all points in between.

This isn’t a review, merely a recommendation. If you are interested in how an army repeatedly developed its tactical thinking over time and managed to adapt itself to the range of circumstances facing it in widely varying situations, this is the book for you. The British Army by this account was far more dynamic, inventive and innovative during this period (70-years) than I had ever given it credit for. The publisher’s blurb captures Davies’ work perfectly:

In this wide-ranging and highly original account, Huw Davies traces the British Army’s accumulation of military knowledge across the following century. An essentially global force, British armies and soldiers continually gleaned and synthesized strategy from warzones the world over: from Europe to the Americas, Africa, and Asia. Davies records how the army and its officers put this globally acquired knowledge to use, exchanging information and developing into a remarkable vehicle of innovation―leading to the pinnacle of its military prowess in the nineteenth century.

Lots of interesting features leap out of the study. One is the fact that it is exposure to combat that keeps the sword sharp. Long periods of peace induce a dangerous lassitude in armies that only hard, relentless training can, in part overcome. In my book with General Lord Dannatt, being published next month, we see the effects of this lassitude on the British Army of the inter-war years, when the Army lost sight of what it might need to do - hard fighting of an intense kind against an inventive and aggressive foe - and suffered confusion and repeated defeat as a result.

For me the most fascinating point Dr Davies raises regularly is the difference between the needs of fighting a tactical engagement (a ‘battle’) and that of securing an operational or strategic objective. If war were simply about fighting battles one might find that we could win every one and yet still not secure our strategic goal. This issue bedevilled the British in America, and is well considered by Davies. Believing that securing ground was more important than destroying the enemy army (without which the entire rebellion would have quickly fizzled out), the British made a fundamental error in strategic calculation, even when they introduced a wide range of superb tactical innovations (such as the use of light infantry) that enabled the army to adapt quickly to ‘Wilderness Warfare.’ The lesson is to first determine what is necessary to win a war (one’s ‘military strategy’) and then focus relentlessly on achieving it with all the resources available. Herein lies the essence of operational art. One would assume that this was mother’s milk to soldiers throughout history, but - surprisingly perhaps - is not so. It is this, and much more, that Dr Davies reminds us of in this superb study.